Is Indian secularism dead?

One of my first posts here was a qualified defence of the Indian version of secularism, which I took to mean a pluralist, inclusive approach to religion-state relations. This Indian secularism, I argued, was superior to the Western version because it was more tolerant than exclusionary; it did not require people to choose between communal identities in order to be good citizens. Additionally, this version of secularism was better in the Indian context, since it was informed by the Indian historical experience with a multiplicity of religions and institutional structures. European secularism emerged as a means of dealing with the conflicts which marked the modern religious experience in that context, and a forced importation of those principles into Indian law would probably have done more harm than good.

I'm no longer sure that I was right then. While it is incredible that the Indian version of secularism worked for as long as it did in the decades following Independence, the increased communalization of the public sphere seems to have rendered inclusive secularism a pipe-dream. Part of this may be explained by the ascension to power of the Hindu right, but I'm not sure that paints the whole picture. Firstly, the Hindu right has co-existed with the secular parties in India's political mainstream for a good while now. It's ideas have always been there, so why have they achieved salience only in the past 20 years? Secondly, the Hindu right's meteoric rise to political dominance on the backs of the Hindutva agenda is symptomatic of a greater willingness of the public to buy into their nightmare-peddling. The right didn't create its audience, the audience existed before they came to power. What, then, explains the greater sanguinity of the majority of the Indian population towards religious fragmentation and division in the last few years? Why have the Godhras and the Ayodhyas happened on our watch, rather than in the lives of the first generation of independent Indians?

This is obviously too huge a question to answer in a blog post. An entire book would perhaps be insufficient. I would, however, like to suggest one for the drift away from inclusive secularism towards an increased toleration for communalism in the public space. This draws on some of Pratap Bhanu Mehta's arguments in his brilliant Burdens of Democracy. The peculiar nature of the Indian constitutional system is that it tries to impose liberal institutions and political principles on what is still quite a feudal social structure. The moves to provide representative equality, exemplified by the burgeoning movement for reservations, does enfranchise previously repressed minorities. However, mere enfranchisement does not lead to a more inclusive, egalitarian form of government. What it does, instead, is create a more diverse political elite, which retains many characteristics of the previous regime. Politics in India still remains an effort to grab as much power and patronage one can for oneself (and one's immediate associates), it's just that the Mayawatis and the Mulayams are now as capable of corruption as the Gandhis and the Patnaiks of the past. This communalized race for public resources has an important effect on how people perceive themselves. One's conception of an Indian is no longer an important part of one's identity; rather, one regards oneself more in terms of how one is recognized by the State. It is more important, as a result, if I am a Brahmin, or a Dalit, a Muslim or a Hindu, because my interaction with the State depends on which of these categories I fall into. The line from group-based affirmative action to group-based political disintegration is quite easy to draw.

Now, this is not a post about caste. I use caste politics to make a point which would apply just as much to communal politics. A feudal state with a representative political elite is just as likely to reinforce communal disintegration as casteist fragmentation in political and social relations. This is because a caste- and religion-based political system is incapable of existing without reinforcing some set of prejudices. In Indian politics, therefore, there is no political independent of extant social relations; one cannot regard oneself as an Indian citizen without immediately also regarding onself as a Hindu/Muslim and Dalit/Brahmin (regional politics implies that parochial considerations play a large role here too. Asking what is good of India is likely to be answered with a response motivated by a perception of what is good for Bengal/Kerala/Northeast etc). Perhaps the integrated secularism preferred by the first set of Indian political leaders was destined to failure. A more robust secularism, which keeps religion out of the political sphere at all costs, might have led to a more robust nationalism in a time where the political elites were more representative of the population as large. I can't make the claim that this would have helped move India away from feudalism towards a more modern system of government, but it would have acted as a strong check on the influence of certain community-based ties on national government.